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Abstract
This paper discusses the exercise of judicial power, analyzing it from a theoretical and 
historical point of view. It focuses on the independence and impartiality of this power 
in making decisions, which is different from the other roles played by the State that 
also involve decision-making activities. It is necessary to understand judicial power 
as independent in the sense that independence entails impartiality, so that the judge 
is not subordinated to external powers in a case and the decision does not contain 
personal elements of the judge. 
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Resumo
Este texto trata do Poder Judiciário, analisando-o teórica e historicamente. Ele foca 
a independência e a imparcialidade deste Poder de tomar decisões, que é diferente 
das outras funções exercidas pelo Estado que também implicam tomada de decisões. 
É importante entender o Poder Judiciário como independente no sentido de esta 
independência poder trazer consigo a imparcialidade; assim, o juiz não estaria subor-
dinado a poderes externos em um processo, ao mesmo tempo em que a decisão não 
conteria elementos pessoais do juiz.
Palavras-chave: Poder Judiciário, independência, imparcialidade.
1 New York University. 19 West 4 Street, 403. New York, New York (US) 10012 NYU Mail Code: Internal mailstop 0820.
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Exercising judicial power, as distinct from other 
State functions, has been justiﬁ ed in different ways. All 
of them are somehow connected with the impartiality/
independence or competence/expertise of the judicial 
decision-makers. This article is a ﬁ rst attempt to classify 
these discourses. Two Erkenntnisinteressen motivate the 
research: on the one hand, the attempt to rewrite the 
doctrine of the constitutional State distinguishing types 
of organs and their forms of legitimacy; on the other, the 
will to understand better what is now called the global 
expansion of judicial power.2
The focus here is not going to be on an analytical 
or normative doctrine of the “independence of judicial 
power” inside the modern political and constitutional 
theory,3 but more on what can be called the (self-) jus-
tiﬁ cation of the judicial function as distinct from other 
governmental decision-making activities – some would 
say its “legitimacy”.4
Independence, what?
To begin with, it may be useful to bear in mind 
something we may tend nowadays to forget. For a long 
time, and in societies as different as the Athenian demo-
cracy (Hansen, 1991, notably ch. 8 about the dikaste-
rion), the Ch’ing Chinese Empire (1644-1911) (Sprenkel, 
1962a, 1962b; Bodde and Morris, 1967a, 1967b; Chü, 
1962), or the African cultures based on customary law 
(Epstein, 1954; Gluckman, 1969), the function of adjudica-
tion was not attributed to a distinct and “professional” 
judicial body. It was exercised directly by the political au-
thority, as in Athens, or indirectly by State ofﬁ cials, such 
as mandarins in China. It was towards the end of the Ro-
man Empire (certainly not during the Roman Republic) 
(Girard, 1901; Jolowicz, 1954) that the judicial function5 
started to be exercised by specialized (not independent) 
ofﬁ cials. And it was only in England between the 16th 
and 17th centuries, to my knowledge, that members of 
courts of common law put forward the idea of inde-
pendence vis-à-vis the King’s prerogatives. This is a point 
which will be addressed later.
Here shall be suggested a typology of recurrent dis-
courses that have been used to justify the independence/
distinctiveness of the judicial power – vis-à-vis the other 
functions of the State (legislative and executive) or, more 
simply, vis-à-vis the actor or the agency entitled to exer-
cise political authority (sovereignty, as political and legal 
theorists started to say after Bodin and Hobbes); but also, 
and more basically, independence as impartiality, which 
justiﬁ es the exercise of judicial power, without taking into 
consideration the agency exercising it.
It may be worth saying a few words about the 
concept of “independence”, traditionally used in two 
different ways in connection with judicial function/
power. By speaking of independence, in this context, 
we may design a similar structure of relation betwe-
2 Tate and Vallinder (1995). John Ferejohn rightly suggested that it is important to distinguish between the expansion of power of judges, meaning that they exercise 
greater and greater percentages of executive or legislative power, and the expansion of the jurisdiction of courts as such. Torbjörn Vallinder, in his contribution to the 
quoted book, speaks of “expansion of the province (italics mine) of the courts and judges at the expense of politicians and/or administrators”, a phenomenon described 
as “judicialization of politics”. In the last few years I explored a special dimension of this expansion: the spreading of constitutional adjudication in the contemporary 
world, mostly in the framework of the post-authoritarian states: Ferejohn and Pasquino (2002, p. 21-36, 2003; s.d.).
3 The last book on the topic is, to my knowledge, Russell and O’Brien (2001).
4 See on the same topic: Pasquino (1998, p. 38-50; 2001); also, Grimm (1999, p. 193-215). It is appropriate here to quote a text by Max Weber that is profound and 
fascinating. In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, in which Weber introduced his classiﬁ cation of the forms of legitimacy of the Herrschaft, he wrote: “We have encountered the 
problem of legitimacy already in our discussion of the legal order. Now we shall have to indicate its broader signiﬁ cance. For a domination [Herrschaft], this kind of justi-
ﬁ cation of its legitimacy is much more than a matter of theoretical or philosophical speculation; it rather constitutes the basis of very real differences in the empirical 
structure of domination. The reason for this fact lies in the general observable need of any power, or even advantage of life, to justify itself. The fates of human beings are 
not equal. Men differ in their states of health or social structure or what not. Simple observation shows that in every such situation he who is more favored feels the 
never ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way ‘legitimate’, upon his advantage as ‘deserved’, and the other’s disadvantage as being brought about by the 
latter’s ‘fault’. [...] This same need makes itself felt in the relation between positively and negatively privileged groups of human beings. […] Indeed, the continued exercise 
of every domination (in our technical sense of the word) always has the strongest need of self-justiﬁ cation through appealing to the principle of its legitimacy. Of such 
ultimate principles, there are only three […]” (Weber, 1954, p. 335-336). An interesting aspect, among others, of this text is that Weber turns the standard perspective, 
claiming that in modern society those who have to obey want reasons for their obedience, upside down. In the quoted text, the stress is different: those who speak of 
Legitimitaet der Herrschaft, address ﬁ rst of all [or also?] themselves! A small change of perspective in the Weberian approach may suggest the following consideration: 
those who speak of legitimacy or produce such discourses do not address simply themselves or the Herr in order to produce self-justiﬁ cation. They address also other 
actors: those who have to obey as well as those who try to impose a monopoly of the Herrschaft; in any event, if we consider a modern rational (in the Weberian sense) 
society. One could imagine the “public sphere” of the exercise of authority as a closed space which it is not possible to access without producing arguments that justify 
the legitimacy of exercising part of that public authority. Weber did not discuss this issue probably because he was trying to characterize the “pure” (idealtypisch) forms 
of Herrschaftslegitimitaet. But it is apparent that the exercise of public authority is a polyarchic reality most of the time divided by conﬂ icts concerning the distribution 
of authority itself among different actors. It is inside this battleﬁ eld that discourses concerning the legitimacy and independence of the judiciary may be analyzed, as will 
be attempted in this text, or more exactly in this research project.
5 It should be recalled that Aristotle was probably the ﬁ rst to single out a judicial function, long before the modern theory of the separation of powers, and by the way 
in a different perspective of developing conceptual tools, in order to provide a comparative analysis of different forms of government (politeiai). In his Politics (IV.11 = 
1297b37ff.) he distinguished three elements (mória, more exactly “constituent parts”) of any politeia: to bouleuómenon, to perì tas archás, to dikázon (or dikastikón). 
The latter is normally translated as “judiciary” (Rackham) or “judicial element” (Barker) (δικαζειν, according to Liddell-Scott, means to give a judgement, to decide 
between persons and judge their cause). At 1300b13ff, he qualiﬁ es the dikastikón as the system of law courts (dikasteria).
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en types of actors we have to distinguish.6 On one 
hand, we may want to stress that in the conﬂ ict reso-
lution between two parties, we/they want to rely on 
a neutral, unbiased third party to settle the conﬂ ict. A 
case in point, among many others, which clariﬁ es this 
idea, is the Roman iudex  (Broggini, 1957). The word 
designated a sort of juror or arbiter chosen, with the 
consent of the two parties of the trial, from a list (album 
iudicum) that the magistrate who prepares the case 
(the praetor) presented to the parties. The iudex, who 
is neither a magistrate nor a specialist of the law, will 
render the judgment (sententia) that ends the trial. The 
independence (neutrality) of the third party in charge 
of the adjudication is a possible (and perhaps necessa-
ry) condition for moving from the dyadic to the triadic 
structure of conﬂ ict resolution.7
On the other hand, we have spoken for some 
centuries of an independent judge/judiciary in a slightly 
different sense. What we have in mind most of the 
time nowadays is not simply or essentially the neu-
trality vis-à-vis the two parties of a trial, but the non-
dependence on the other branches of political autho-
rity in a constitutional system based on the separation 
of powers.8 This seems important for two reasons. The 
ﬁ rst was argued by Montesquieu in his criticism of the 
despotic government. To avoid the dangers threatening 
individual liberty that stem from the connection be-
tween legislative and judiciary, he wanted, as we know, 
to separate the “puissance de juger” from the other Sta-
te functions.9 The second reason is connected to the 
American tradition of judicial review of statutes and 
with the French development of “administrative” law 
in the 19th century (Cassese, 2000). In the latter case, 
judiciary independence seems to be welcome when 
the conﬂ icts are between branches of the national go-
vernment or quasi-sovereign entities (states, Länder, 
etc. – what Germans call Organstreit and the Italians 
conﬂ itti di competenza), as well as in cases of conﬂ icts 
between citizens and the government. It is exactly in 
this connection that Germans started to use the word 
Rechtstaat: a legal system where citizens can sue the 
government and hope to have a fair conﬂ ict resolution 
by an “independent” judge. Indeed, we have to notice 
that we ﬁ nd once again in this last case the ﬁ rst form 
of independence: the possibility for the judge to be 
unbiased vis-à-vis the two parties of the trial!10
To avoid misunderstandings, it must be stressed 
that the type of analysis engaged in from now on is di-
fferent from an historical-sociological project. It is not 
asked here why a more or less independent judicial po-
wer was established in modern society; in that perspec-
tive something like a Pontius Pilate theory of “washing 
the hands” can make sense.11 The question to be discus-
sed is what type of ideology12 social actors produced in 
order to ﬁ nd support for some (thin or thick) version 
of a independent/distinct judicial power. 
Moving from such a question, the triadic typo-
logy that is proposed for consideration goes under the 
names of three rightly “celebrated” authors: Montes-
quieu, Edward Coke and Thomas Hobbes.
6 In other words, in speaking of independence we must ask: independent from what/whom?
7 On this conceptual distinction, see Aubert (1983, p. 58-76).
8 It is clear that in the international arena the equivalent of these branches can be either States or any other biased or partisan international actor. 
9 “There is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and the executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject 
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be the legislator” (Montesquieu, s.d., p. 99). Elsewhere (Pasquino, 1994), the author offered the following 
comment on this doctrine: “A judiciary power, separated from the legislative, in an institutional system which distinguishes the organs exercising these two functions 
and not only the functions themselves, is, in its autonomy, according to Montesquieu’s literal phrasing, a null power. The judges act as nothing more than the ‘bouche de 
la loi’. They should also conﬁ ne themselves to applying a general and abstract norm to concrete cases without any possibility of modifying, in particular instances, the 
set deﬁ nition of crimes and punishment. That deﬁ nition is in the hand of the legislator, who must enact laws without considering any inﬂ uence they might exert when 
applied to this or that concrete case. Characterized in this way, the judiciary power also appears as a sort of neutral power which protects citizens from the legislative 
while depriving both legislators and judges of the possibility of modifying the law in response to concrete cases. The judges become accordingly the guarantee of citi-
zens’ equality before the law. However, Montesquieu was perfectly aware that the person who exercises judicial power is the one who owns the most worrying power 
of all. In daily life it is not the legislator who renders judgments or passes sentences, but the judge. Now, the separation of powers guarantees that the judge will pass 
judgment only on the basis of a norm of which he is not the author, but simply the material executor. The judge protects the citizen from caprices and the arbitrary 
will of the legislator, just as the existence of the law protects the accused from the caprices and arbitrary will of the judge. All that is the substance of the principle of 
the juridical culture called the independence of the judiciary. If this independence is threatened, there is no longer any protection for citizens confronting the possibly 
arbitrary will of the legislator. The Rechtssicherheit would disappear if the judge could pass his judgment without being bound by the existence and the content of a 
law. Finally, the essential and unavoidable core of this version of the separation of powers lies in the principle of a strict distinction between those who enact the law 
and those who pass judgments.” This commentary to Montesquieu’s text was written without awareness of a problem that limits the dependence of the judge on the 
law – the other side of his independence from the legislator. As Gustavo Zagrebelsky has shown in a recent text, Studi in onore di Livio Paladin (unpublished), the judge 
sometimes has the possibility to deﬁ ne the legal character of a fact. A killed B. This is not yet a legal fact if the judge does not state that the action is murder or was 
carried out in self-defense. The text by Zagrebelsky illustrates the important implications of such philosophical platitude.
10 On these questions, see the important article by Eckhoff (1965, p. 11-48).
11 This is the idea that the sovereign delegated judicial power to a specialized organ to avoid paying the costs of exercising directly a repressive and unpopular function. 
This theory was put forward by Savigny (s.d., p. 286-287) at the beginning of the 19th century, concerning the distinction in Rome during the Republic between the 
praetor and the iudex. Versus: Girard (1901, p. 79): “C’est trop peu dire que de traiter cette supposition de gratuite”.
12 The word has here a neutral sense, without derogatory implications.
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The pouvoir nul. The “zero”
degree of power
The ideology of the French Revolution, which 
has long been very inﬂ uential in the European continent, 
proposed a special interpretation of Montesquieu’s for-
mula according to which the judiciary is a “null power”. 
To summarize brieﬂ y, the idea is that the legitimacy and 
the justiﬁ cation of an independent judiciary originates 
from the paradoxical circumstance of its lack of power! 
In fact, the exact meaning of the expression “pouvoir nul” 
in the Esprit des Lois XI.6 was that the judicial power 
had to be exercised (or more precisely was exercised in 
England, according to Montesquieu)13 by popular juries, 
and not by professional judges. The point here is not 
to re-examine the historical truth of what Montesquieu 
did really say.14 It is a destiny common to many great 
thinkers that they have been misunderstood and beco-
me famous and inﬂ uential through misunderstandings.15 
It sufﬁ ces simply to draw attention to the fact that the 
French Revolution and a large part of the continental 
legal culture introduced both professional, bureaucra-
tic judges and the ﬁ ction of a null power. Michel Tro-
per goes even further, writing that “le système juridique 
français, parce que il est fondé depuis la Révolution sur 
la primauté de la loi, ne saurait admettre l’existence 
d’un pouvoir judiciaire.”16 Cazalès, an ultra-conservative 
and monarchical member of the ﬁ rst French National 
Assembly, spelled out the same point: “le jugement est 
l’acte matériel de application de la loi” (Royer, 1996, p. 
263). What does that mean?
The judge produces decisions concerning the li-
berty (and sometimes unfortunately the life) of citizens 
by a judgment, a sentence. But what is a sentence? The 
French Revolution, Cazalès, Condorcet and Kant (na-
mes which are not normally associated!) claim that the 
sentence is simply the conclusion of a syllogism. Kant, in 
the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (1797), 
paragraph 45, writes:
Every state contains three powers, i.e. the universally 
united will is made up of three separate persons (trias 
politica). These are the ruling power (or sovereignty) in 
the person of the legislator, the executive power in the 
person of the individual who governs in accordance 
with the law, and the judicial power (which allots to 
everyone what is his by law) in the person of the jud-
ge (potestas legislatoria, rectoria et iudiciaria). […] They 
can be likened to the three propositions in a practi-
cal operation of reason [syllogism]: the major premise, 
which contains the law of the sovereign will, the minor 
premise, which contains the command to act in accor-
dance with the law (i.e. the principle of subsumption 
under the general will), and the conclusion, which con-
tains the legal decision (the sentence) as to the rights 
and wrongs of each particular case17.
We know that this doctrine of the practical 
syllogism, applied to the judicial power, has been de-
nounced as ﬁ ction for a long time.18 It is less well 
known, parenthetically, that Carl Schmitt published a 
radical criticism of the same doctrine in 1912, in his 
ﬁ rst book Gesetz und Urteil,19 the starting point of 
his so-called “Decisionismus”. Nonetheless, that ﬁ ction 
produced two practical effects. This is, by the way, a 
good reason to take it into account. On the one hand, 
it justiﬁ ed the absence of responsibility of the judge. 
An automaton that does not exercise any will can-
not and does not need to be accountable, notably 
since there is always a superior court (the Cour de 
cassation) checking the logical deduction of the jud-
ge.20 On the other side, the same “ﬁ ction” justiﬁ ed 
the constitutional subordination of the judiciary to 
its two more important brothers: the legislative and 
13 This claim is historically wrong, but it is not the intention of the author to discuss here the accuracy of Montesquieu’s description of the English “constitutional” 
system. On this topic, see Landi (1981).
14 The author is unaware of any important inquiry about Montesquieu’s theory of the judiciary. A possible starting point is Vile (1967, p. 94-106).
15 Machiavelli and Rousseau, alongside Montesquieu or Nietzsche, are very good examples of this claim.
16 Italics added by the author. Quoted by Royer (1996, p. 263).
17 Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant (1977, p. 138). Cesare Beccaria (1764) put forward a similar argument: “In ogni delitto si deve fare dal giudice un sillogismo perfetto; la 
maggiore dev’essere la legge generale; la minore, l’azione conforme o no, alla legge; la conseguenza, la libertà o la pena.” (ch. IV: Interpretazione delle leggi). (“In every 
criminal case, the judge should come to a perfect syllogism: the major premise should be the general law; the minor premise, the act which does not conform to the 
law; and the conclusion, acquittal or condemnation”).
18 Nonetheless, two among the best specialists of the European judiciary wrote recently: “the still prevalent treatment of the continental European civil law judiciaries 
depicts them as mostly bureaucratic organizations, made up of politically irrelevant judges whose role can be summarized in Montesquieu’s words: to be the ‘mouth 
that speaks the words of the law’”, Guarnieri and Magalhães (2001).
19 A small sample of this book is now available in the English translation in Jacobson and Schlink (2000, p. 63-65).
20 The Founding Fathers during the French Revolution did consider that at times the law could have been unclear and in need of interpretation, but they were anxious 
to strip away this power from the courts. This is the reason why the revolutionary legislation introduced the so-called référé législatif that gave the legislative assembly 
the monopoly of the statutory (and a fortiori constitutional) interpretation. See Troper (1980, p. 58-68); and “judges shall have recourse to the legislative body whenever 
it appears desirable to interpret a law” (Act, 7 July 1790 = référé législatif); “Courts cannot interfere with the exercise of legislative powers or suspend the application 
of the laws” (Law of 16-24 August 1790).
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the executive powers. As Adrien Duport said in the 
debate on the organization of the judiciary in the 
Constituent Assembly:“il n’y a réellement de pouvoir 
dans l’ordre judiciaire que le pouvoir exécutif [...]” 
(Royer, 1996, p. 263).
To summarize that point, the doctrine of the in-
dependent,21 subordinate judiciary22 asserts that where 
there is no will, there is no responsibility, since responsibi-
lity, accountability and control imply the exercise of some 
decision, volition or discretion that by this ideology are 
denied to judges and judicial function. So if it is accepted 
that the judge does not do anything else than applying/en-
forcing the law, then there will be no speciﬁ c problem of 
legitimacy for the judicial authority! This must be obeyed 
because the judge is just the mouth of the law, applying the 
general will of the people to a concrete case. To speak 
like Rousseau, in obeying the judge, we just obey oursel-
ves (or the elected legislator) and remain perfectly free 
because no heteronomous will is imposed on us.
A special knowledge. Edward Coke, 
Artiﬁ cial Reason and James I
The second model or discursive ideal type of 
legitimizing judicial power comes from a conceptual 
world older than democracy, or French liberal culture. 
It is found in the universe of competence or expertise, 
among judges of English common law courts, which, in a 
context different from the French Revolution, opposed 
the monarchical power. 
Why do we obey the prescriptions of a medical 
doctor? We certainly believe she is making a choice 
and even imposing prescription on our behavior. But 
we believe also that we will be better off in obeying 
her if we really think the doctor knows what she is 
doing. A sophisticated version of this type of argument 
was ﬁ rst spelled out by the judge Sir Edward Coke 
in the conﬂ ict between King James I and the English 
courts of common law, of which Coke was the chief 
justice. In a remarkable text he argued against James 
that the knowledge of the laws of England “requires 
long study and experience before that a man can attain 
to the cognizance of it”. This argument was made to 
persuade the King that he might have the constitutio-
nal power to be the ﬁ nal judge of a conﬂ ict, but he had 
not the “artiﬁ cial reason” in order to correctly exer-
cise it. So, King James would have to leave that power/
competence to his competent judges.
To understand better this type of argument we 
may turn brieﬂ y to the contemporary historical context. 
The English 17th century was characterized by a con-
ﬂ ict of arms and words among different segments of the 
ruling elite. The best-known aspects of this conﬂ ict are 
those between the crown and the aristocracy and the 
clash between the King and the Parliament concerning 
the question of the prerogative, when the Stuarts tried 
to break the mixed government in favor of an absolutist 
version of the monarchy (this at least is the parliamen-
tary version of the conﬂ ict). The focus here will be on a 
different aspect, probably less well known, but of great 
interest to the present topic: the conﬂ ict between James 
I and the courts of common law. 
Sir Edward Coke is famous in the history of legal 
doctrine as the champion of the judiciary independence 
vis-à-vis the political power of the King.23 The victory in 
1688, thanks to the Glorious Revolution, of a strong parlia-
mentary version of the ancient doctrine of King in Parlia-
ment puts this event into perspective.24 The reason why 
it is also addressed here is that it contains the matrix of 
one of the important ideologies of a legitimate judicial 
power, the ideology that in a particular taxonomy can be 
called “legitimacy through expertise”. In 1607, in connec-
tion with a dispute between the High Commission, an 
ecclesiastical court of which the chief justice was the Ar-
chbishop Bancroft, and the Court of Common Pleas, its 
chief justice, Coke, issued an opinion that may be conside-
red as the manifesto of that ideology. In the opinion kno-
wn as Prohibitions del Roy (12 Coke’s Reports 63) we read:
[Bancroft claimed that] the King himself may decide [= 
judge] in his royal person; and that the Judges are but 
delegates of the King, and that the King may take what 
causes he shall please to determine, from the determina-
tion of the Judges, and may determine them himself. And 
the Archbishop said, that this was clear in divinity, that 
such authority belongs to the King by the words of God 
in the Scripture. To which it was answered by me, in the 
presence, and with the clear consent of all the Judges of 
England, and Barons of the Exchequer, that the King in 
his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, 
as treason, felony, etc., or betwixt party and party, con-
21 Here, independence in the narrowest sense of the word means that the judiciary is not exercised by the legislative power and that judges cannot be ﬁ red because 
of their judicial decisions.
22 For the conception of the judiciary as an independent and “coordinate” power in America at the end of the 18th century, see Kramer (2001).
23 I am fully aware that it is a little bit of an anachronism to speak of judicial power, as such, in England during the 17th century. But I am not taking sides here on this 
institutional question. Coke seemed to believe that legislation and jurisdiction are basically the same function.
24 The Septennial Act of 1730 forbade the courts to overrule legislative enactments.
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cerning his inheritance, chattels, or goods, etc., but this 
ought to be determined and adjudged in some court of 
justice, according to the law and the custom of England 
[…] Then the King said, that he thought that the law was 
founded upon reason, and that he and others had rea-
son, as well as the Judges; to which it was answered by 
me, that true it was, that God had endowed his Majesty 
with excellent science, and great endowments of nature; 
but his Majesty was not learned in the law of his realm 
of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheri-
tance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to 
be decided by natural reason but by the artiﬁ cial reason 
and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires 
long study and experience, before that a man can attain 
to the cognizance of it; and that the law was the golden 
met-ward and measure to try the causes of the subjects; 
and which protected his Majesty in safety and peace; with 
which the King was greatly offended, and said, that then 
he should be under the law, which was treason to afﬁ rm, 
as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, quod Rex non 
debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege.25
We have to bear in mind that, since the 13th cen-
tury, England was one of the ﬁ rst countries in western 
society where an elite group of law specialists existed,26 
exercising, by the King’s delegation, the judicial power. 
Coke was the ideologue and spokesman of those judges 
of common law. To follow the traces of this ideology in 
the American continent would be an interesting inquiry, 
but it is certainly not possible here.
The direction shall turn instead to the third ele-
ment of the taxonomy directly connected with Coke’s 
doctrine. Indeed, his defense of the independence of ju-
dicial power and its foundation on the judges’ expertise 
became the polemical target of a radical criticism by one 
of the strongest and least-listened to supporters of the 
King’s power: Thomas Hobbes.
Impartiality. The moral foundation of 
Judicial Power
During the 1760s, Hobbes wrote a book, The 
Dialogue between a philosopher and a student of common 
law of England,27 entirely devoted to the criticism of 
Coke (who died much earlier, in 1633 or 1634). But 
the essential core of his argument was presented in 
chapter 26 of his Leviathan devoted to “civil laws”.28 It 
is important to analyze this text in some detail, since 
it incorporates the essential core of what might be 
called the ideology of impartiality as a foundation of the 
judicial function.29
Hobbes (Hobbes and Curley, 1994, p. 197-198) 
starts by distinguishing the role of judge [the good In-
terpreter of the Law] from the ﬁ gure of the attorney 
[Advocate]. Only the latter, he claims, needs to study 
the law of the land. As to the former, he is only sup-
posed to know facts from the witnesses and statutes 
with the help of competent individuals authorized by 
political authority. Intuitively, it appears that Hobbes 
is opposing Coke herein on the Roman republican 
division of competencies between the praetor and the 
iudex! In any event, his argumentative strategy con-
sists of separating expertise from judgment/adjudica-
tion. In order to support his point, he puts forward 
examples drawn from English institutions: the House 
of Lords as a court of justice (“few of them were much 
versed in the study of the Laws, and fewer had made 
profession of them”) and the popular jury (“Twelve men 
of the common People are the Judges, and give Sentence 
not only of the Fact, but of the Right”). Now, says Hob-
bes, since these “judges” are not supposed to know 
the law, there is somebody “that hath the Authority to 
inform them of it” [of its content].
Having established this distinction between the 
two functions of judging and knowing the law – exactly 
the contrary of what Coke argued – Hobbes goes on 
to explain the (moral) qualities that are “required in a 
Judge”. In opposition to competence and expertise, he 
puts at the bottom of judicial power the moral quality 
of impartiality, which in his own language is called, surpri-
singly enough, equity.
The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpre-
ter of the Laws, are, ﬁ rst, A right understanding of the 
principal Law of Nature called Equity; which depending 
25 “For the King ought not be under any man but under God and the Law”. On Coke’s theory of law and reason, see Lewis (1968, p. 330-342).
26 On the professionalization of English judges at the end of the Middle Ages, see J.H. Baker, “The Legal Profession” and “The Legal Profession and its learning” (unpu-
blished manuscript communicated by the author).
27 The Dialogue was ﬁ rst published posthumously in 1681, by William Crooke. “The Dialogue is less a survey and exposition of the law than it is an attempt to show how 
it should be understood on Hobbesian lines and an attack on English legal theorists, especially Edward Coke, who adopted a position that Hobbes regarded as theo-
retically wrong and politically pernicious” (Goldsmith, 1996, p. 287). (“From Hobbes’s point of view, Coke’s theory asserts the authority of judges, courts, and lawyers 
over that of the legislator”, ivi, p. 293; “Hobbes’s hostility to Coke and the common law is a direct result of his adherence to the primacy of legislation. From Hobbes’s 
point of view, Coke’s view attributes sovereignty to the judges”, ivi, p. 296).
28 Opposed by Hobbes to “natural laws”.
29 Stricto sensu, it is not possible to speak of independent judiciary in Hobbes’ political theory since he rejected any separation of power. He presented nonetheless a 
doctrine of judicial function that will be analyzed.
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not on the reading of other men Writings, but on the 
goodness of a man own natural Reason,30 and Medita-
tion, is presumed to be in those most, that have had 
most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate 
thereon. Secondly, contempt of unnecessary Riches, and 
Preferments. Thirdly, To be able in judgment to divest 
himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion. 
Fourthly, and lastly, Patience to hear; diligent attention in 
hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he 
hath heard.
“Equity” in the language of contemporary En-
glish jurisprudence meant “the recourse to general 
principles of [natural] justice to correct or supplement 
the provision of a law” (Oxford English Dictionary). 
According to Grotius: “the correction of that, wherein 
the law (by reason of its universality) is deﬁ cient” (in 
Blackstone, Commentaries of the Laws of England, vol. I, 
p. 14).31 Hobbes, as he often does, modiﬁ es the sense 
of a word – remember his sovereign deﬁ nes the me-
aning of words! Equity is according to him a law of 
nature, exactly the 11th. Here is the deﬁ nition from 
chapter 15:
If a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it 
is a precept of the law of nature, that he deal equally 
between them. For without that, the controversies 
of men cannot be determined but by war. He the-
refore that is partial in judgment, doth what in him 
lies, to deter men from the use of judges, and arbi-
trators; and consequently, against the fundamental 
law of nature, is the cause of war. The observance 
of this law, from the equal distribution to each man, 
of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called 
EQUITY, and, as I have said before, distributive justice: 
the violation, acception of persons, προσωποληψíα 
[partiality].32
I do not want to offer here a conclusion to this 
ﬁ rst genealogical exploration, but perhaps only stress 
that independence of the judicial power has always to 
be understood as an instrument to achieve the goal of 
impartiality; and that independence has to be conceived 
of as neutrality, and absence of the subordination of the 
judge to (a) the parties to the conﬂ ict, (b) to any other 
power interested in a given resolution of the conﬂ ict, 
and as far as possible (c) to the bias of passions and 
partiality of the judge himself or herself.
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